Ideas from 'Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself)' by David Lewis [1994], by Theme Structure

[found in 'A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind' (ed/tr Guttenplan,Samuel) [Blackwell 1995,0-631-19996-9]].

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2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument

3993	Arguments are nearly always open to challenge, but they help to explain a position rather than force people to believe

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction

3990	The whole truth supervenes on the physical truth

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience

3991	Where pixels make up a picture, supervenience is reduction

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind

3995	A mind is an organ of representation

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind

3994	Human pain might be one thing; Martian pain might be something else

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind

3989	I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology

3992	Folk psychology makes good predictions, by associating mental states with causal roles

18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought

3996	Folk psychology doesn't say that there is a language of thought

18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content

3998	If you don't share an external world with a brain-in-a-vat, then externalism says you don't share any beliefs

3997	Nothing shows that all content is 'wide', or that wide content has logical priority

3999	A spontaneous duplicate of you would have your brain states but no experience, so externalism would deny him any beliefs

4000	Wide content derives from narrow content and relationships with external things